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1. INTRODUCTION 
                                                     
1 Csaba (1997) and Coyne (2007) published papers earlier with similar titles. However, the content of 
these publications is different from that of my paper. Csaba deals with the relationship of market and 
democracy within the context of the postsocialist reform process; in his blog, Coyne argues that 
economic and political freedoms belong together. I do not address the first issue and write about the 
second in more detail in this paper. 
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The connectedness of market economy (capitalism) and representative democracy is the 
dominant structural characteristic of social development in Western Europe and North 
America. Theories looking at the relationship of market and democracy reflect upon this 
connection. I write about these theories. I do not ask the question which theory the relationship 
of market and democracy better in modern capitalism, instead I focus on the relationship of 
different theoretical statements that seem to rival with one another. Consequently, this paper 
does not try to analyze the relationship of market and democracy, but the relationship of 
different theories dealing with the relationship of market and democracy. I ask the question 
whether the different theoretical statements about the relationship of market and democracy 
are compatible with, or contradict, one another. First, I define the concepts of market and 
democracy, then I reconstruct the different theoretical statements about the relationship of 
market and democracy in a stylized form. This is followed by an examination of these 
apparently contradicting statements in order to find out whether they really contradict one 
another or not. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. THE CONCEPTS OF MARKET AND DEMOCRACY 
 
Both market and democracy can be considered as mechanisms of coordination.2 Market is a 
particular form of the coordination of economic actions, democracy is a particular form of 
coordination of political actions. In Kornai’s book (Kornai 1992) representative democracy is 
not listed as a coordination mechanism, but self-governance is. Self-governing coordination 
can be interpreted as a concept describing direct democracy, however, it can also be extended 
to representative democracy, since this coordination mechanism allows for vertical 
relationships and for an electoral process that puts decision makers into power (Kornai 1992: 
123-124). Representative democracy is the political mechanism of transforming individual 
choices into collective ones, therefore it can be interpreted as a coordination mechanism. 
 “Markets, in short, are organized and institutionalized recurrent exchange”, says 
Hodgson (2008).3 Markets may exist in any society but become the general and dominant 
coordination mechanism of economic activities only in capitalist society. Market serves as an 
institution of competition among economic actors. Non-market societies were trapped in a 
                                                     
2 The concept of coordination mechanism was coined by János Kornai. See Kornai (1984; 1992: 122-
139). 
3 See also Kapás (2003) about the theories of market in economic science. 
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dichotomy of competition for wealth against preserving social integration. Only market society 
(capitalism) makes it possible for individuals to compete for wealth without threatening with 
the disintegration of society. Economic competition becomes possible because market as a 
coordination mechanism separates the integration of the economy from that of society. 
Different authors representing rival schools of thought seem to agree on this point. 
 Marx wrote that in precapitalist societies it was the community and in capitalist society 
it is money that organizes economic activities. “Money [...] directly and simultaneously 
becomes the real community [Gemeinwesen]” (Marx 1993: 225.). In capitalism the impersonal 
market mechanism constitutes the social connection of individual economic activities. This is 
what Marx (1990: 187) called reification:  
Men are henceforth related to each other in their social process of production in a purely atomistic 
way. Their own relations of production therefore assume a material shape which is independent of 
their control and their conscious individual action. This situation is manifested first by the fact that 
the products of men’s labour universally take on the form of commodities. The riddle of the money 
fetish is therefore the riddle of the commodity fetish, now become visible and dazzling to our eyes. 
 
Polanyi identified capitalism with market society. In market society the economy is not 
embedded in society. The coordination of economic activities is done not by social norms but 
by the self-regulating market.  
A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an 
economic and a political sphere. Such a dichotomy is, in effect, merely the restatement, from the 
point of view of society as a whole, of the existence of a self-regulating market. (Polanyi 2001: 74) 
 
Hayek, similarly to Marx, describes the spontaneous market order as an impersonal mechanism 
that cannot be understood and regulated by those individuals who create and maintain it. People 
are unable to extend a deliberate control over the price mechanism. “Its misfortune is the double 
one that it is not the product of human design and that the people guided by it usually do not 
know why they are made to do what they do” (Hayek 1945: 527). The market frees the 
coordination of economic activities from the direct rule of social norms. Since the market is an 
impersonal mechanism of resource allocation it can be neither just nor unjust (Hayek 1993a: 
70). 
 Following Lockwood (1964), Habermas argued for a distinction between system 
integration and social integration. For him the economy (and also the polity) is the sphere of 
impersonal coordination as opposed to the social life world that is the sphere of social 
integration ruled by social norms. “The market is a mechanism that ‘spontaneously’ brings 
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about the integration of society not, say, by harmonizing action orientations via moral or legal 
rules, but by harmonizing the aggregate effects of action via functional interconnections” 
(Habermas 1987: 115). The market order is the domain of norm-free sociality.4 
 These different definitions of the market describe it as the coordination mechanism of 
capitalism. This notion of the market assumes the dichotomy of market society versus non-
market society and define the market as an impersonal mechanism of coordination. The rule of 
market coordination is based on the separation of the private and the public sphere of society, 
on the formation of an autonomous private sphere in society. The emergence of the private 
sphere in society, its separation from the public sphere, makes it possible for economic actors 
to engage in the accumulation of economic wealth expressed in a monetary form and to sell 
their labor. The commodification of labor becomes possible just because in capitalism those 
who work with capital are socially constituted as private persons who may sell their labor. The 
actors of a market economy are private individuals who have the autonomy to make economic 
decisions. Therefore market coordination simultaneously assumes the freedom and the formal 
equality of economic actors. Economic actors are free because they enter transactions 
voluntarily and not under the compulsion of political force. Economic actors are also equal 
because they are treated in the same way by the law and not according to their social status. At 
the same time this formal equality assumes the existence of substantive inequality because the 
impersonal market mechanism will make some economic actors richer than others. 
 In this paper, when I use the category of market, I will refer to capitalism (market 
society) that made market coordination the general mechanism of economic coordination. 
 Democracy is a specific form of coordination of political activities. It is the specific 
feature of the political sphere that those who possess political power make binding decisions 
on the members of the political community on the basis of the monopoly of the means of 
violence. In a political democracy these binding decisions are linked to the decisions made by 
citizens. Citizens decide to delegate power to their representatives via democratic elections. 
Therefore the concept of political democracy assumes the freedom of choice of citizens: voters 
decide freely how they vote. The concept of political democracy also assumes the political 
equality of citizens. In representative democracies political equality means equality before the 
law, equal right to vote (each citizen has just one vote) and to be elected. Political democracy 
                                                     
4 Habermas (1987: 114) refers to Luhmann when he uses the term of norm-free sociality (normfreie 
Sozialität). 
 5 
as a coordination mechanism aggregates the individual decisions of citizens into a collective 
political decision through the procedural rules of elections. 
 In a representative democracy, according to Schumpeter, citizens decide about who 
should be given the right to make binding political decisions on the basis of the monopoly of 
means of violence.5 Political democracy is the institutionalization of competition for power. 
Political democracy is able to introduce competition for power into society, without 
disintegrating it. Political democracy is the coordination mechanism of peaceful transformation 
of power among the members of society.6 At the same time, political democracy is an 
impersonal mechanism for exercising power. Within political competition, the individuals who 
exercise power can be substituted for each other, power is not ascribed to the persons who 
exercise it and the failure of the incumbent executive does not mean the failure or collapse of 
the political system. 
 This definition of democracy does not deal with its specific forms, instead it grasps the 
common features of these specific forms. Consequently, the concept of political democracy is 
built on the dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship and anchors in the Schumpeterian 
procedural concept of democracy, it does not associate substantive contents related to political 
inputs and outputs with the concept of democracy. 
 In this paper when I use the concept of democracy, I will refer to a form of political 
coordination that institutionalizes party competition in order to transfer power from citizens to 
their representatives. 
 
3. RIVAL THEORIES ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF MARKET AND DEMOCRACY 
 
One may distinguish four theorems7 about the relationship of market and democracy: 
                                                     
5 “And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1994: 269). 
6 See Mises (1996: 150); Popper (1971: 124); Hayek (1993b: 5); Lindblom (1977: 133); Przeworski 
(1999: 23). 
7 Beetham also writes about four theorems in his essay (Beetham 1993). Out of these four theorems, 
two overlap with those in this paper: these two are the necessity and the disability theorems. In 
Beetham’s analysis, the other two theorems are the analogy theorem that states that democracy should 
be understood on the basis of an analogy with the market and the superiority theorem that argues that 
the polity can never be as democratic as the market. The overlap is partial mainly because Beetham’s 
research question and program is different from those in this paper. Beetham wants to develop a critical 
analysis of the ideology that captures and limits our thinking about the understanding of politics. He 
seems to resent if this thinking tries to explain politics on the basis of the logic of the market within the 
framework of a liberal theory. Therefore he reconstructs four liberal theorems that can be criticized in 
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(1) The necessity theorem8 ([M→D]+): market (M) is the necessary condition of democracy 
(D).9 
(2) The inequality theorem ([M→D]-): market limits democracy. 
(3) The optimality theorem ([D→M]+): democracy is the optimal condition of market. 
(4) The disability theorem10 ([D→M]-): democracy limits market. 
 
These theorems are summarized in Table 1.11 
 
Table 1. Theories on the relationship of market and democracy 
causal relation supportive (+) antagonistic (-) 
M→D 
Necessity theorem 
Market is the necessary 
condition of democracy 
There is no political freedom 
without economic freedom 
Inequality theorem 
Market limits democracy 
Market inequalities overwrite 
political equality 
D→M 
Optimality theorem 
Democracy is the optimal 
condition of market 
Democracy is the institutional 
safeguard of market freedom 
(rationality) 
Disability theorem 
Democracy limits market 
Democracy is used to limit 
economic freedom (rationality) 
and/or equality  
  Source: author 
 
3.1. Necessity theorem ([M→D]+) 
The necessity theorem says that market is a necessary condition of democracy. Economic 
freedom is the necessary condition of political freedom. Market and democracy fit structurally 
together: they both institutionalize individual rights. There is an internal relationship between 
economic freedom that guarantees private autonomies that are the foundations of market 
transactions of individuals and political freedom that guarantees the political rights (freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly) that are the foundations of political democracy (Beetham 
                                                     
a way that theoretically opens up the possibility of political action denied or assumed away by the liberal 
theory. 
8 This term has been borrowed from Beetham (1993: 188). 
9 In the titles of the theorems M stands for market, D stands for democracy, → stands for causal 
relationship. + is the sign of positive, - is the sign of negative relationship. 
10 I took this term from Beetham (1993: 188). 
11 The idea of this table comes from Offe who deals with the relationship of market, democracy and the 
welfare state in two tables. His first table is about theories on the relationship of market and the welfare 
state, his second table is about theories on the relationship of democracy and welfare state (Offe 1987: 
505, 510). I instead drew the third table on the relationship of market and democracy. Since Offe did 
not reflect on this third possible pair of concepts he did not create this third table. 
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1993: 189). The separation of the private and the public sphere in modern societies is based on 
this structural fit: the emergence of capitalism is linked to the emergence of the dual 
subsystems of private economy and political community. In other words, the emergence of 
democratic capitalism separates the competition for wealth from that for political power.12 
 Both market and democracy are the institutionalizations of competition among 
individuals. As North, Wallis and Weingast point out, a non-market economy limits economic 
competition by denying free access of individuals to economic resources and organizations. 
Therefore it does not allow for the emergence of political competition based on free and equal 
access to political resources and organizations: the elites that are able to monopolize economic 
resources are also able to limit political competition. They need to limit political competition 
in order to preserve their economic privileges (North et al. 2006: 32).13 On the other hand, 
market competition and political competition reinforce each other, say North, Wallis and 
Weingast. The open access economic system as a system of economic competition supports 
the open access political system as a system of political competition. In an open access 
economic system the individuals may set up a great number of private organizations that will 
contribute to the political representation and protection of private interests. Under the pressure 
of market competition the economic position of individuals cannot be fixed and safeguarded, 
due to the market forces of “creative destruction” these positions are open to a constant change. 
In a market economy the allocation of resources is regulated by the impersonal price 
mechanism. Therefore, those who exercise political power will not control the allocation of 
economic resources and the primary distribution of income. In an open access economic system 
those individuals who exercise political power cannot appropriate a constant flow of economic 
rents that could have been directly used for limiting political competition. Also, in an open 
access political system party competition may be more robust and effective (North et al. 2009: 
24–25). 
 There exists a causal relationship between market society (capitalism) and political 
democracy. Modern representative democracy is the product of the emergence of private 
economic activities and the market order. Democracy is a tool in the hands of new private 
                                                     
12 “The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive 
capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power 
and in this way enables the one to offset the other.” (Friedman 2002: 9.) Olson also finds this structural 
correspondence important: “They [democracies] also have the extraordinary virtue that the same 
emphasis on individual rights that is necessary to lasting democracy is also necessary for secure rights 
to both property and the enforcement of contracts. The moral appeal of democracy is now almost 
universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely understood.” (Olson 1993: 574–575). 
13 A similar argument can be found in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 284–285). 
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actors to protect their autonomies against the state by imposing limitations on the exercise of 
political power. According to Schumpeter “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist 
process” (Schumpeter 1994: 297). “No bourgeois, no democracy” says Moore (1974: 418). 
 The necessity theorem does not assume a symmetric relationship between market and 
democracy, because it acknowledges that the market is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of democracy. In other words, the market supports but does not guarantee political freedom 
(see Beetham 1993: 189).14 
 
3.2. Inequality theorem ([M→D]–) 
Market limits democracy. The market creates economic inequalities and for this reason 
undermines political equality. Democracy functions selectively, because in practice the 
principle of one voter - one vote is getting injured. Although procedurally it is true that each 
vote has the same weight, still it may happen that one vote will count more than another one. 
This statement is descriptive and not normative, it explains why the procedurally given political 
equality may be damaged in the democratic process. 
 Downs connects this theorem to the problem of information. In the world of perfect 
information political equality based on the equality of votes does hold.  “[...] in a world where 
perfect knowledge prevails, the government gives the preferences of each citizen exactly the 
same weight as those of every other citizen” (Downs 1957: 139). Therefore “[...] the equality 
of franchise is successful as a device for distributing political power equally among citizens” 
(Downs 1957: 139). However, the assumption of perfect information is an unrealistic one. In 
the real world information is imperfect, consequently the equality of votes does not exist. In 
order to make a choice voters need information that is not given but has to be acquired. It needs 
the mobilization of resources. Since the market allocates resources in an unequal way, those 
who are better off gain advantage and may influence the choices of those voters who are worse 
off. “As a result, equality of franchise no longer assures net equality of influence over 
government action. In fact, it is irrational for a democratic government to treat its citizens with 
equal deference in a world in which knowledge is imperfect” (Downs 1957: 140). 
 Hayek points out that in modern representative democracies the principle of limited 
government is in conflict with that of the limitlessness of the majority rule of decision.15 In the 
                                                     
14 This asymmetric relationship between capitalism and democracy was already dealt with by 
Lindblom (1977). 
15 “A majority of the representatives of the people based on bargaining over group demands can never 
represent the opinion of the majority of the people. Such ‘freedom of Parliament’ means the 
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fight of the two principles the former is defeated by the latter. In representative democracies 
the winner of elections faces no constraints in the exercise of executive power. At the same 
time the requirement to get the majority of votes makes political democracy vulnerable against 
particular interests: in order to maximize votes the actors of political competition undertake the 
representation of particular interests. Consequently, the working of representative democracy 
may become selective (Hayek 1993b: 128-129.). 
 The theory of structural dependence of the state on capital also points out the selective 
bias of political democracy. In capitalism, the decisions of the actors both in the private and 
the political sphere are determined by the structural dependence of economic and political 
actors on capital, as summarized by Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988) in their excellent paper. 
In the economy the welfare of market actors is determined by the allocation of resources which 
is dependent on private entrepreneurial decisions. Entrepreneurs react to the decisions of other 
actors: if these decisions limit the profitability of investments they may postpone or change 
their investment decisions in a way that will have negative effects on consumers. Therefore, in 
order to avoid the fall or the absence of the rise of their welfare these other actors are compelled 
to anticipate the reactions of entrepreneurs to their decisions, that is to constraint their own 
demands or actions in order to preserve the benefits they may have due to the decisions of 
private entrepreneurs. In their summary, Przeworski and Wallerstein point out that this is also 
true for political actors: political decision makers are also structurally dependent on capital. 
The incumbent political actors in a democracy want to be reelected, consequently they care 
about the effects of their political decisions on the welfare of voters. If these decisions hurt the 
private interests of entrepreneurs, the consumption of voters may be reduced due to the changes 
in private investment decisions and consequently the chances of reelection of incumbent 
politicians will also be reduced (Przeworski – Wallerstein 1988: 11-14).16 “[...] Vote-seeking 
politicians are dependent on owners of capital because voters are.” (Przeworski – Wallerstein 
1988: 12.) 
 It follows from the thesis of structural dependence that political actors will pay attention 
to the interests of the actors personifying capital even if these private actors do not do anything 
in order to push their interests. Lindblom supplements these structural arguments with 
instrumental ones by pointing out that in a capitalist society not only employees, but also 
                                                     
oppression of the people. It is wholly in conflict with the conception of a constitutional limitation of 
governmental power, and irreconcilable with the ideal of a society of free men” (Hayek 1993b: 134). 
16 See also Miliband (1969), Block (1977), Offe (1975), Lindblom (1977). 
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employers organize their interest representation (Lindblom 2001: 247).17 However, the 
different actors within the private sphere will be able to mobilize resources in order to increase 
their influence on political decisions in an unequal way. The interest representation of private 
entrepreneurs will be more successful than that of other interest groups because they are able 
to mobilize more economic resources in service of their political aims than others, argues 
Lindblom.18 
 The inequality theorem focuses on one specific aspect of the conflict of market and 
democracy. The theorem refers to substantive outcomes of the market process, not to the formal 
characteristics of the market related to the institutionalization of the autonomy of individual 
choice. In other words, it looks at the relationship of market and democracy from the 
perspective of economic inequalities, not from that of economic freedom. It shows how market 
inequalities may overwrite the procedurally defined political equality of democracy and how 
they will be able to influence the outcomes of political democracy. 
 
3.3. The optimality theorem ([D→M]+) 
Democracy is the optimal condition of market. Non-democratic political systems may also 
establish and protect those private autonomies that are necessary for the working of 
capitalism, however, they will do it less efficiently than democratic political systems can do it 
and just for a limited period of time, says the optimality theorem. 
 The establishment of political competition will prevent political elites to monopolize 
economic resources. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) show that in a democracy the actors of 
the private economy are able to protect their economic autonomy against the state only because 
they can rely on the political competition of elites who are dependent on the vote of citizens. 
Due to political competition, the political actors will not be able to eliminate private 
autonomies and market competition.19 
 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) argue that democracy is the best institutional 
safeguard of market freedom because it offers a solution for the commitment problems of 
                                                     
17 The distinction between structural and instrumental power can already be found in Miliband (1969). 
See also Hacker and Pierson (2002: 280–281). 
18 “Inequalities in income and wealth create inequalities in opportunity to run for office, in launching 
candidates, in capacities to use the mass media to influence voters, in lobbying, and in social interchange 
with party and government officials. Because market systems produce inequality of income and wealth, 
they obstruct democracy” (Lindblom 2001: 236). 
19 “Inclusive political institutions, vesting power broadly, would tend to uproot economic institutions 
that expropriate the resources of the many, erect entry barriers, and suppress the functioning of 
markets so that only a few benefit” (Acemoglu–Robinson 2012: 77). 
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political authority. Since there is no higher authority above the state that would be able to tie 
the hands of governments in the exercise of power, the commitment of political authority 
becomes a problem. How can those who exercise political power be prevented from using it to 
reallocate economic resources in a way that is advantageous only for them? If the state promises 
not to use its power for the purpose of redistribution, is this commitment credible? Capitalism 
and market coordination require the state to respect private economic autonomies (property 
rights, in the first place). Both democracies and dictatorships seem to be able to commit 
themselves to respecting private economic autonomies but the commitment of dictatorships is 
less certain than that of democracies, because in a dictatorship this commitment is tied to the 
person of the dictator and his personal decisions, while in democracies it is tied to the 
impersonal mechanism of democratic competition. 
 In democracies with the separation of powers there will be a functioning Rule of Law 
that limits state power, consequently the commitment of the state to respect private autonomies 
does not depend on the changes about who personally exercises power and how the personal 
preferences of political decision-makers change (Acemoglu et al. 2004: 3-4). In dictatorships 
the dictator stands above the law, while in democracies the executive power is limited by the 
rule of law. Therefore, those incentives and constraints that inform property rights and the rules 
of contracts may significantly be different in democracies and autocracies, say Clague and his 
co-authors (Clague et al. 1996: 246). In dictatorships market actors may easily develop a 
symbiotic relationship with those who exercise political power and may be able to constrain 
and distort economic competition, set up and maintain barriers to market entry (Acemoglu 
2008: 35-37). 
 The coexistence of non-democratic political system with market order is unstable, 
because it connects contradictory logics, argue Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Consequently, 
sooner or later this connection must break up. One possibility is that the extractive (non-
democratic) political system prevails and those who exercise political power will use it to 
extract rents from the economy, in other words, they transform the order of market competition 
into an extractive economic system based on monopolies. The other possibility is that market 
competition prevails, the actors of the private economy become strong and in order to defend 
the inclusive economic order (market competition) they will be able to transform the political 
system into an inclusive (competitive) one (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012: 78-79). 
 These arguments already connect the optimality theorem with the necessity theorem 
that focuses on the structural correspondence of market and democracy. I will come back to 
this connection later in this paper. 
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 Lindblom also says that democracy supports capitalism, however he connects this 
argument to the inequality theorem. For him it is the overwriting of political equality and not 
the presence of political freedom and political competition that explains why democracy 
supports capitalism. The inequality theorem points out that democracy represents economic 
and political interests with a bias, that is selectively. Democracy reinforces capitalism just 
because the interests of business, private owners are overrepresented in the political system. In 
other words, if democracy would not work selectively in favor of business, that is if there 
existed political equality, democracy would not support capitalism, or democracy would even 
undermine the market order (Lindblom 1977: 168-169). This final statement takes us to the 
disability theorem. 
 
3.4. Disability theorem ([D→M]-) 
This theorem has a strong and a weak version. The early strong version stated that capitalism 
and democracy were incompatible, because in democracy market losers would organize a 
majority coalition that would turn political power against private ownership and market 
coordination and would put capitalism to an end (Przeworski 1991: 53–54). Facts do not 
confirm this strong version. The relationship of capitalism and democracy proved to be stable 
against the protests of losers. However, the disability theorem did not disappear but was 
transformed. The modern, weak variant does not talk about the incompatibility of capitalism 
and democracy but about their conflictious coexistence. The question in this case is not whether 
democracy eliminates capitalism but how democracy undermines or weakens capitalism 
(market order)? 
 Market coordination generates income inequalities, the distribution of income by the 
market creates winners and losers. The disability theorem infers from the existence of market 
inequalities that democracy constraints the market: both winners and losers may want to use 
democracy in order to constrain the market order. 
 The main business actors, that is the winners, are able to realize their economic interests 
with the mediation of the political system. Particular industries may apply for state regulation 
in order to limit entry, that is competition, argues Stigler (1975: 114). The large corporations 
of different industries are interested in the stability of the market, in the limitation of entry and 
they are able to achieve their goals (Fliegstein 1996: 661). On the other hand, Schattschneider 
argues that it is not the representatives of big business (the winners) but those of smaller firms 
push the state toward economic regulation. He says that the losers are interested in changing 
or modifying market outcomes through state regulation. The winners, large firms, are happy 
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with the income distribution resulting from market coordination, therefore they do not want to 
modify it (Schattschneider 1975: 37-39).20 
 The losers of the market allocation of resources may constrain the autonomy of market 
coordination and weaken the economic institutions of capitalism through democracy. Free 
market economy and democracy do not mutually reinforce each other, to the contrary, political 
democracy must lead to the limitation of market freedom, says Dahl (1993: 259-260). Since 
the incomes of market actors are not going to be equalized by the market and some will have 
higher income than others, the losers will use their political power represented by their votes 
to improve their economic situation: they will want to limit market freedom and redistribute 
market incomes via state intervention (Dahl 1993: 267). Since democracy is the political 
competition of political actors who want to maximize votes, assuming the existence of 
universal franchise they will have strong incentives to capture the votes of losers and offer state 
intervention in exchange, argues Dahl (1993: 277-278). 
 An alternative formulation of the disability theorem is offered by Claus Offe. Offe 
characterizes the relationship of market and democracy as a conflict between economic 
rationality and political legitimacy. Under the pressure of democratic legitimacy politicians 
increase redistribution, limit the autonomy of the market and overburden the state in order to 
satisfy voters. The conflict of market and democracy is coded into the structure of modern 
capitalism: due to institutionalized state intervention capitalism simultaneously relies on two 
problem-solving mechanisms that contradict each other: market coordination on the one hand 
and politicization of economic decisions on the other hand, says Offe. Capitalism is based on 
the separation of system integration (market coordination) and social integration (political 
democracy), however, state intervention, the welfare state connects these two forms of 
integration and unleashes the intervention of social integration into system integration (Offe 
1990: 83). “There is the attempt to free the spheres of production and distribution from politics 
– and to take back this depoliticization at the same time.” (Papp 1983/1984: 147). 
 The disability theorem focuses on one aspect of the conflict between market and 
democracy, namely how the outcomes of the democratic political system may modify the 
outcomes of market order by the political limitation of market autonomies. 
 
4. DISCUSSION: THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE FOUR THEOREMS 
                                                     
20 “Since the contestants in private conflicts are apt to be unequal in strength, it follows that the most 
powerful special interests want private settlements because they are able to dictate the outcome as long 
as the conflict remains private” (Schattschneider 1975: 39.) 
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How are the four theorems connected? I order them into pairs and examine the relationship of 
each two elementary theorems within each composite thesis. Figure 1 shows that the pairwise 
combination of the four theorems leads to six composite theses. 
 
Figure 1. The combinations of individual theorems 
Causal relationship supportive (+) antagonistic (-) 
   
M→D M→D+ M→D- 
   
   
D→M D→M+ D→M- 
   
Source: author 
 
4.1. Thesis 1 on the mutual compatibility of market and democracy ([M→D]+ and 
[D→M]+) 
Market supports democracy and democracy supports the market. The two statements are in 
harmony and reinforce each other. Thesis 1 says that capitalism and democracy serve as 
conditions for each other. Economic freedom is a necessary condition of political freedom, 
political freedom is the optimal condition for the defense of economic freedom. The structural 
fit of capitalism and democracy makes democratic capitalism a stable economic-political order. 
 North and his co-authors call this structural correspondence double balance.21 The 
theory of double balance states that the open-access economic system and the open-access 
political system are mutually contingent and they reinforce each other (North et al. 2009: 24.). 
In open access orders economic and political competition strengthen each other.22 Due to 
                                                     
21 Double balance is “a correspondence between the distribution and organization of violence potential 
and political power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the 
other hand.” (North et al. 2009: 20.) 
22 “[...] open access and entry to organizations in the economy support open access in politics, and open 
access and entry in politics support open access in the economy. Open access in the economy generates 
a large and varied set of organizations that are the primary agents in the process of creative destruction. 
This forms the basis for the civil society, with many groups capable of becoming politically active when 
their interests are threatened. Creative economic destruction produces a constantly shifting distribution 
of economic interests, making it difficult for political officials to solidify their advantage through rent-
creation. Similarly, open access in politics results in creative political destruction through party 
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impersonal market competition the political elites of a limited access political order would lose 
their economic resources coming from monopolistic rents and this would undermine and 
endanger the existence of the ruling political coalition (North et al. 2009: 41). In reverse, in an 
open access political order due to political competition the economic actors are able to preserve 
economic competition, limit or prevent those political interventions that put it into danger. 
 Acemoglu and Robinson also emphasize the elective affinity between the patterns of 
political and economic order: extractive political institutions coexist with extractive economic 
institutions, while inclusive political institutions build a coherent whole with inclusive 
economic institutions by creating a virtuous circle (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012: 76–77, 276). 
They reflect on three important mechanisms of the virtuous circle between inclusive economic 
and political institutions. 
 First, the plural, competitive political system does not allow for the concentration of 
political power in one hand. This way the inclusive political order makes it difficult to eliminate 
the inclusiveness of the economic order. The plural political system supports the rule of law 
that imposes legal constraints upon all political actors and protects the autonomy of the private 
sphere, the working of market coordination against powerful political actors. The rule of law 
protects political equality and eliminates the arbitrary use of power. 
 Second, the inclusive economic system, that is the market order, eliminates the direct 
connection between political position and economic gain. Therefore, the economic elite may 
become interested in the support of political democracy, just because it separates the 
accumulation of economic wealth from the political position of individuals. 
 Third, the inclusive political system leads to the emergence of a public sphere that is 
independent from those who exercise political power. This public sphere is instrumental for 
the organization of those actors who protect the inclusive economic order against political 
threats (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012: 283–284). 
 Kurki defines the combination of the necessity ([M→D]+) and the optimality 
([D→M]+) theorems as the thesis of complementarity. She distinguishes four variants of the 
theory of complementarity: (1) capitalism and democracy necessarily complement each other; 
                                                     
competition. The opposition party has strong incentives to monitor the incumbent and to publicize 
attempts to subvert the constitution, open access in particular” (North et al. 2009: 24–25). I have to note 
that the authors do not identify the open access order with democracy. They accept the minimalist 
definition of democracy as a system of political competition among political parties. However, this 
competition may formally exist but may be made substantively empty at the same time (North et al. 
2009: 137). This is an important issue, but for this paper it is enough to see that all open access orders 
are democracies although not all democracies are open access orders. 
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(2) capitalism and democracy statistically complement each other; (3) capitalism and 
democracy are functionally similar to each other; (4) capitalism and democracy complement 
each other by chance (Kurki 2014: 124-128). I think that these four variants can be aggregated 
into two. First, (1) and (3) belong to each other, since they posit an internal relationship between 
the two theorems – complementarity by necessity leads to functional similarity and vice versa. 
Second, (2) and (4) can also be aggregated, because they assume instead of an internal and 
analytical connection an external relationship between capitalism and democracy – be it 
statistical coincidence or pure chance. The theories put into variant (4) are at the same time 
rather heterogeneous, this variant contains causal explanations about the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy that may fit better and can be regrouped into variant (1). Therefore 
the thesis of mutual compatibility incorporates into itself Kurki’s variants (1) and (3) and also 
partially (4). 
 To sum up, the two elements of the thesis of mutual compatibility analytically 
presuppose each other, both state the internal connection and the structural fit of capitalism and 
democracy. This mutual correspondence is based on the joint existence of the actors’ freedom 
of choice in the private sphere of the economy and the public sphere of the polity. 
 
4.2. Thesis 2 on the partial non-compatibility of the market ([M→D]+ and [M→D]-) 
The market is simultaneously the condition of, and the limitation on, democracy. The 
separation of the private and public sphere of society comes into existence with the emergence 
of capitalism. This separation makes democracy possible in the first place, because it creates 
private autonomies and new individual rights that are set free from the former status 
hierarchies. The outcome is the social distinction between the private individual (bourgeois) 
who is the actor of the economy and the citizen (citoyen) who is the actor of the polity. This 
distinction is the condition for the exercise of democratic rights and the constitution of political 
equality. The individuals are constituted as citizens, as equal members of the political 
community just by distinguishing their private (economic) existence from their public 
(political) existence. On the basis of this distinction, we can consider individuals to be equal, 
we do not let their economic inequality overwrite their political equality. 
 At the same time the separation of the private and public sphere will constrain political 
equality and lead to a selective functioning of democracy. The reason for this is that political 
equality does not eliminate but underwrite private economic inequalities by constituting the 
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sphere of equality as the sphere of polity outside of the sphere of economy.23 Consequently, 
the material inequalities of the private sphere will have an influence on the exercise of political 
rights in the public sphere. 
 Thesis 2 does not contain logical contradiction, instead it argues that freedom and 
equality come into conflict in democracy. The market has a positive effect due to market 
freedom and a negative effect due to market inequalities on democracy. Procedurally political 
equality exists, since all citizens have equally one vote, but the politically equal citizens will 
be able to mobilize resources in order to influence voter’s preferences to a different extent, 
because the inequality of citizens as private individuals prevails in the private sphere of society. 
 If the assumption of perfect information is dropped and it is taken into consideration 
that the market economy creates and maintains economic inequalities, it can also be understood 
that the principle of equal votes may be undermined. The votes and preferences of those 
citizens who are better informed and mobilize more economic resources will count more than 
those of others. 
 Thesis 2 states that voters’ freedom of choice is formally secured, but the material 
content of these choices may be influenced by the economically powerful few. Both statements 
seem to be true, there is no logical contradiction between them, since the first statement refers 
to political freedom and the second to political equality.24 The two theorems of the composite 
thesis 2 about the non-correspondence of the market equally reflect the structural separation of 
the market economy and political community. The two units of this thesis target the 
simultaneous togetherness and conflict of political freedom and political equality that comes 
into existence as the consequence of the emergence of democratic capitalism. In democratic 
capitalism economic freedom calls for political freedom and economic inequality results in 
substantive political inequality (the selectivity of democracy). 
 
4.3. Thesis 3 on the partial non-compatibility of democracy ([D→M]+ and [D→M]-) 
Democracy is simultaneously the condition of, and the limitation on, the market. This thesis is 
the reversal of thesis 2: democracy simultaneously protects and limits capitalism, the autonomy 
of the private sphere. There is a logical contradiction between the two parts (the two theorems) 
                                                     
23 This argument was formulated by Marx (1978) as a criticism of capitalism.  
24 This distinction between freedom and equality is also emphasized by Beetham in a way that fits thesis 
2: “in considering the causal relationship between the market and democracy, we should be careful to 
distinguish different aspects of the market. As a system of power dispersal, it is conducive to the 
maintenance of political freedoms; as a systematic generator of inequalities within and between 
countries, it is destabilizing to democracy” (Beetham 1993: 192). 
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of the thesis only if we use the strong version of the disability theorem ([D→M]-). In this case 
democracy and capitalism exclude each other, since democracy will be the instrument to put 
an end to market order, consequently democracy ceases to exist as a condition of market 
economy. The optimality theorem ([D→M]+) falls. 
 However, if we accept the weak version of the disability theorem there will be no logical 
contradiction between the two elements of thesis 2. In this case both theorems may be true 
because the protection and the limitation of the market order may complement each other. The 
first part of thesis 2 which is the optimality theorem, says that democracy is the condition of 
capitalism because it introduces constraints on the exercise of political power. Democracy 
limits the activities of the state by protecting the rule of law, and as a consequence it maintains 
the separation of the private and public sphere of society and safeguards the private autonomies 
of the market order. 
 If we interpret the disability theorem as a theorem about the political influence of the 
market winners who want to constrain the market order, it will not contradict to the optimality 
theorem because the political limitation of the market ([D→M]-) in this case does not mean 
the elimination of the autonomy of market coordination; to the contrary, the political regulation 
of the market will be a specific (limited) form of market autonomy that will be reinforced by 
democracy ([D→M]+) and support the interests of market winners. 
 If we interpret the disability theorem as a theorem about the political influence of the 
market losers who want to constrain the market order, the disability and the optimality 
theorems will still remain compatible. In this case the disability theorem shows that the 
extension of the franchise in democracy leads to extended state intervention into the economy. 
Universal franchise gives voting right to market losers. In the system of democratic party 
competition in the framework of which parties try to maximize their votes, the supply of 
welfare state programs may help them to extend their voter bases to new groups. As a 
consequence, the state intervenes into the economy and compensates market losers. Welfare 
states do constrain private autonomies but protect the market economy. The compensation 
given to market losers on the basis of the limitation of the market order will protect capitalism 
against the political attack of losers by reconciling them with this market order. From this it 
follows that the disability theorem about constraining the market is subordinated to the 
optimality theorem about protecting the market. In other words, the theorem about the conflict 
between capitalism and democracy is subordinated to the theorem about the compatibility 
between capitalism and democracy. 
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4.4. Thesis 4 on the compatibility of democracy and the incompatibility of market 
([D→M]+ and [M→D]-) 
Democracy is a condition of market and market is a constraint on democracy. These two 
statements do not contradict, to the contrary they reinforce each other. Democracy safeguards 
the autonomy of the market order, the functioning of market coordination, states the optimality 
theorem ([D→M]+). However, the inequality theorem ([M→D]-) assumes that the market 
constrains democracy because it overwrites political equality. It may seem that the combination 
of the optimality and the inequality theorems contains a circular reasoning along the following 
lines: a weakening democracy will not be able to protect the market to the same extent and will 
weaken market coordination, a weaker market coordination will limit inequalities and 
strengthen democracy, a stronger democracy will strengthen the market order, a strong market 
order will weaken democracy, a weak democracy will weaken the market order, and so on. The 
paradox does not hold because the two theorems refer to two different dimensions: the 
optimality theorem talks about freedom of choice and the inequality theorem talks about the 
damages done to political equality. The market may constrain political democracy but it does 
not mean that any damage is done to political freedom, to voters’ freedom of choice. The latter 
does exist even if the equality of votes does not.25 What is more, if we accept Lindblom’s 
variant of the optimality theorem, we get to the conclusion that it is exactly the selectivity of 
democracy that supports market coordination. Formal (procedural) political equality may result 
in substantive economic inequalities and it means that on the basis of market inequalities, 
democracy may provide advantages to particular private interests. Therefore, democracy 
protects the market just because the market order makes democracy selective. The winners of 
market competition are interested in the defense of democracy because democracy selectively 
supports the winners and weakens politically those market losers who could have constituted 
danger to the market order. Consequently, thesis 4 also subordinates the theorem about the 
conflict between capitalism and democracy to the theorem about the compatibility between 
them. 
 
                                                     
25 Vanberg (2005: 33–43) emphasizes the importance of this distinction. He introduces the concept of 
choice individualism. He says that both market and democracy need to be examined as orders based 
upon the freedom of individual choice and not as the domain of aggregated utility maximization. Choice 
individualism analyzes market and democracy on the basis of a procedural logic and not on the basis of 
substantive outcomes.  
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4.5. Thesis 5 on the compatibility of market and incompatibility of democracy 
([M→D]+) and [D→M]-) 
Market is a condition of democracy and democracy is a constraint on market. This thesis is the 
reversal of thesis 4. The necessity theorem ([M→D]+) states that the freedom of market 
coordination is the necessary condition of political freedom and equality. The disability 
theorem ([D→M]-) states that political democracy will put constraints on the market order. 
 The disability theorem can be interpreted in two ways. First, if we consider the political 
decisions of the economic losers of market competition we may conclude that the political 
freedom and equality of voters leads to the policies of diminishing economic inequalities. Vote 
maximizing politicians will compensate the losers of market competition via welfare state 
redistribution. In this interpretation the two theorems are compatible. Democracy may 
constrain but does not eliminate market autonomy, the constraining effects of democracy on 
market remain constrained. The market order is modified but not eliminated, the freedom of 
individual market choice remains and may serve as the basis of the freedom and equality of 
individual political choice. 
 Second, if we focus on the economic winners of the market order, we may argue that 
the winners will want to use democracy in order to constrain market coordination. Constraining 
market coordination will provide economic rents for the winners. In this case the disability 
theorem will not be connected to the necessity theorem but to the inequality theorem ([M→D]-
). Winners will be able to constrain the market through political decisions if they are able to 
constrain the equality of political choice through their influence on voters. This effect is 
captured not by the necessity but the inequality theorem and by the combination of the 
disability and the inequality theorems. This combination is the content of thesis 6. In other 
words, in this case thesis 5 is referred to and translated into thesis 6. 
 
4.6. Thesis 6 on the mutual incompatibility of market and democracy ([M→D]-) and 
[D→M]-) 
The combination of the inequality ([M→D]-) and the disability ([D→M]-) theorems leads to 
the statement that the market constrains democracy and democracy constrains the market. Dahl 
aptly calls this relationship antagonistic symbiosis (Dahl 1998: 166). “Democracy and market-
capitalism are locked in a persistent conflict in which each modifies and limits the other” (Dahl 
1998: 173). This thesis is the mirror image of thesis 1. Thesis 1 does not refer to the conflict of 
market and democracy, thesis 6 does not reflect on the mutual correspondence of market and 
democracy. 
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 The two theorems combined by thesis 6 may be true at the same time. Whether they are 
internally connected or not depends on how the disability theorem is interpreted. If in the 
framework of the disability theorem the focus is on economic winners, we get to the statement 
that the winners are able to limit economic competition by political means because they are 
able to mobilize economic resources in order to make democracy more selective. Economic 
inequalities may be translated into political inequalities and vice versa. In this case the 
disability theorem is successfully linked to the inequality theorem ([M→D]-) on the basis of 
the assumption about the internal relationship between the two. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that market inequalities and political inequalities, the selectivity of political 
democracy may support and reinforce each other but it does not mean the elimination of 
economic and political freedom. The constraints on market coordination and political 
democracy are established without eliminating the freedom of economic and political choice. 
In other words, these constrains exert their influence not against but on the basis of those 
procedural rules of market coordination and political democracy that establish economic and 
political freedom as it is argued in thesis 1. 
 If in the framework of the disability theorem the focus is on economic losers we get to 
the statement that due to market induced economic inequalities losers may be able to use 
democracy against the market order relying on their protest votes. Democracy constrains 
capitalism in order to compensate the losers. This statement assumes that the market did not 
make democracy selective. Although losers are able to mobilize less economic resources, 
political decisions still do reflect the interests of losers, because the inequalities created by the 
private sphere of society were successfully separated from the political sphere of democracy 
that establishes political equality. In this case the argument about the negative effect of 
democracy on the market (disability theorem - ([D→M]-)) is based on the necessity theorem 
([M→D]+) and not on the inequality theorem ([M→D]-), because the statement about the 
political strength of losers assumes that losers use their protest votes successfully, therefore 
political freedom and equality prevails against economic inequalities. There is no mechanism 
that would successfully transform the majority votes of losers into minority votes, that is 
democracy will not work selectively. In other words, focusing on the losers’ influence on the 
market order the disability theorem is internally connected to the necessity theorem ([M→D]+) 
and rejects the inequality theorem ([M→D]-). In this case thesis 6 is referred back to and 
translated into thesis 5. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
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The analysis of the four theorems and the six composite theses leads to the conclusion that the 
relationship of capitalism and democracy is not external, they are internally related. Lindblom 
shows that although democracy is related to capitalism, capitalism may not be related to 
democracy (Lindblom 1977: 161-169). The relationship between market and democracy is not 
symmetric. However, an internal relationship does not have to be a symmetric one. 
 The theoretical controversy about capitalism and democracy did not bring up arguments 
that exclude each other. Thesis 1 argues about the mutual compatibility of capitalism and 
democracy. Theses 2 to 5 focus on the conflict between capitalism and democracy without 
going beyond the assumption about their compatibility. Therefore, thesis 1 is compatible with 
theses 2-5. Thesis 6 is the opposite of thesis 1. Thesis 6 states that capitalism and democracy 
mutually weaken each other. Is there a logical contradiction between thesis 1 and 6? I argue 
that it is not the case because thesis 6 does not just deny but also relies on thesis 1. However, 
following Lindblom, the thesis about the mutual compatibility between capitalism and 
democracy does not or should not imply that capitalism and democracy are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for each other. Almond (1991: 473) is right, “democracy and capitalism 
are both positively and negatively related, they both support and subvert each other.” It can be 
added that the negative and positive relationships between capitalism and democracy are not 
symmetric, the conflict between capitalism and democracy comes about and remains within 
the framework of mutual compatibility. As thesis 1 argues, there is a structural compatibility 
between capitalism and democracy because both the economic and political coordination 
mechanisms map the separation of the private and the public spheres of society: both market 
coordination and democracy may work just because they are separated from the other 
coordination mechanism. This separation creates economic and political freedoms that serve 
as a basis for market order and political democracy. At the same time this separation is the 
source of tensions and conflicts between capitalism and democracy, mainly due to the effect of 
private economic inequalities on political equality. The thesis about the mutual reinforcement 
of capitalism and democracy and the thesis about the conflict between them can simultaneously 
be stated because the dimensions of unity and conflict are different: unity refers to freedom, 
conflict refers to inequality. 
 Is there any practical relevance of the analysis of, and conclusions drawn from, the 
theoretical controversy about the relationship of market (capitalism) and democracy? My point 
is that it may help to understand the stability of democratic capitalism. Those theorems that 
assume a negative relationship between market and democracy point out that capitalism and 
democracy mutually weaken each other and may conclude that democratic capitalism is fragile, 
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it is not sustainable, it will break down. However, the theorems and theses that thematize the 
conflict between capitalism and democracy still rely on those theses and theorems that 
thematize the mutual compatibility of capitalism and democracy. The selectivity of democracy 
and the political constraints imposed on market order may not undermine democratic 
capitalism because they may retain economic and political freedoms in a modified form. As a 
consequence, we can also understand why democratic capitalism may remain stable. However, 
two caveats should be made. 
 First, the theory about the stability of democratic capitalism argues that the tensions 
that exist between capitalism and democracy can and will be contained by them. This 
conclusion may be correct, but only under specific social conditions. In other words, the theory 
about the stability of democratic capitalism describes relatively well the relationship of 
economic and political order in modern Western societies. By maintaining the separation and 
the working of economic and political competition these societies could develop the relative 
stability of democratic capitalism. 
 Second, none of these arguments should be read as a theoretical proof that excludes the 
possibility of the regression of democratic capitalism. The implication of thesis 1 ([M→D]+ 
and [D→M]+) is not that democratic capitalism cannot backslide but that if it happens it will 
distort both capitalism and democracy.26 
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